By Dr Paul Talling, Biosecurity Advisor
I spent the day at the FluTrail Map session at University of Cambridge recently and it was one of the most useful AI (avian flu) conversations I’ve been in for a while.
Did we crack the Avian Influenza (AI) problem – no we certainly did not. But we did get a good insight into the research conducted for the FluTrail Map and lots of opportunity to discuss and elaborate on it. The workshop format of the day was excellent, there were no sales pitches, no “talking shop,” and no overt personal agendas. There were just growers (big and small), vets, scientists and industry people in the same room, comparing notes on issues relating to AI, e.g., what’s working, what isn’t, and what still doesn’t add up.
That shared, honest atmosphere matters. A problem shared really is a problem halved and it’s how we get from “we’re all firefighting” to “we can get ahead of this”.
The 5 elements FluTrail Map is tackling (and why they connect)
The project work was structured around five key areas:
- Farm biosecurity – what’s being done, what isn’t, and what gets in the way
- Epidemiology – understanding patterns: what’s happening, where, and why
- Ecology & modelling – what the wider environment and wild-bird movements are telling us
- Infection dynamics – how the virus behaves (and what we still don’t fully understand)
- Host factors & movement – how different hosts, people, and movements influence spread
All five are important but what struck me most was how often the conversation came back to the same practical sticking points.
1) We are still guilty of talking about “biosecurity” as infrastructure measures – but behaviour (how infrastructure is actually used) is so much more important.
Reassuringly, across the room, the strongest agreement was that behaviour, education, and “people factors” sits right at the top of the reasons why biosecurity breaks down.
Not because farms don’t care – but because behaviour is messy:
- motivation drops when pressure is constant
- biosecurity fatigue is real
- compliance shifts depending on perceived risk
- “Small mistakes + bad luck” can undo a lot of good work
- training and reinforcement aren’t consistent across every role on site
And this is the bit that often gets missed in research: the virus must travel from outside to inside. If people movement is a bridge, then everyday habits really do matter.
A genuine example: the family member who covers a shift once a week on a Saturday morning. Why are they any less of a risk than full time staff? Why are they often excluded from staff training? Why don’t they change their footwear like everyone else does? These behavioural questions need answering if we are to get anywhere near a biosecure workplace.
2) The “outside to inside” transition is where the real battle is being fought
Whilst a significant amount of research is being conducted on the movement of the AI virus in the environment, most people are accepting that the virus arriving onto a single farm can be a particularly random event depending mainly on wild bird activity and subsequent environmental pressure – along with a significant element of chance.
However, regardless of external pressure, the virus must still get into the building to infect the birds.
The emphasis is shifting toward what happens at this boundary. It was encouraging to hear that more focus is now being placed on this from a scientific epidemiology angle too.
There was a very interesting discussion around small animals (wagtails, starlings, mice and rats) potentially playing a much bigger role than previously thought. This strengthens Livetec’s long held belief that mechanical transfer is a significant mechanism by which virus enters a building.
3) Biosecurity isn’t a tick-box (and neither should compliance be)
I pushed this point (probably more than once): The objective of implementing biosecurity is not just so an audit requirement can be complied with.
The problem when it just becomes a tick-box exercise is that people then do the bare minimum, with little appreciation or understanding of the reasons for the control strategy. In this case, we shouldn’t be surprised when outcomes don’t change.
What we need is biosecurity that’s lived, not “completed”.
Which leads to the next big gap…
4) We need to stop only talking about the cost of biosecurity and start proving the value
A lot of discussion touched on financial pressure: “biosecurity costs money”. This was especially pertinent to business managers who are always under pressure to justify any investments or expenditure made.
The big question is: does better biosecurity save (or even make) money? And can we show it in a way that’s genuinely quantitative?
There’s a research opportunity here:
- link production performance and medicine records over time
- create baselines for “no disease / high performance” vs “dragged down by disease pressure”
- therefore turning biosecurity improvement into measurable financial impact
If we want behaviour change at senior management level, we need numbers that people can use. “Monetising biosecurity” is important – at a farm level, it’s probably the difference between papering over cracks or having the finance/commitment to make real change and sustain high levels of control.
5) The system still runs on paper in places and it’s slowing everyone down
One of the most eye-opening “small things” was how much is still paper-based, even when it creates totally avoidable friction.
A practical example that came up: some poultry movements still require a physical paper document in the cab and if it’s midnight and nobody has a printer or an open office, you’re stuck.
It sounds minor, but these are exactly the kind of everyday barriers that grind overall compliance down. The big lesson: it’s not always the big biosecurity decisions – it’s the small process failures that contrive to break the chain.
Vaccination conversations are shifting (and cost is part of it)
The final section moved into vaccination, and the tone felt different to previous years – more serious, more “this may be sooner than we think”.
One key point: when the full cost of an outbreak is properly accounted for (not just farm-level cost, but admin, lab testing, staffing, reporting), vaccination may not be as expensive relative to outbreaks as it’s often assumed.
There are still major barriers (trade status being the obvious one), but the sense I got was: this isn’t a distant debate anymore – particularly for turkeys and ducks, and in higher-risk production systems.
My biggest overall takeaway
The room wasn’t split by business size or job title. People were comfortable talking at a common level about a subject that matters to all.
If we want progress, we need more of these “honest rooms”: shared learning, reducing assumptions, and with a focus on practical reality – how risk changes, how people behave, and what would make it easier for everyone to do the right thing every day.
It was great to be part of the conversation at this workshop session, and everyone contributed openly on the day. Let’s hope some more funding can be secured and these types of events can be continued.
If you were there and want to continue the discussion, I’d welcome it. Click here to book a call.
